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Even before the economic emergency that the country announced in September 2020,
the Government of Sudan desperately needed stable revenue. For instance, the
Sudanese Pound has been devalued at least four times since 2018 and o cially
in ation reached at least 230 percent in October 2020. But these already worrisome
numbers fail to provide a full account of in ation rates throughout the country. The
real exchange rate for US dollars (USD) to Sudanese Pounds (SDG), which impacts an
estimated 90 percent of transactions within the country, paints an even more extreme
scenario. In 2018 approximately 1 USD could buy 30 SDG whereas a dollar is now
roughly equivalent to 270 SDG today.
In addition to Covid-19, which has tragically ripped through Sudan and slowed
economic activity within the country, high in ation rates are exacerbating economic
hardships for most people. It is common for individuals to spend an entire
day queuing for fuel, the price of bread has yet again increased, and mobile phone
credit is increasingly out of reach for many people as remittances from abroad have
slowed down. The uptick in these kinds of di culties is not to be underestimated
since diminished economic circumstances were at the heart of the previously
unthinkable uprising that contributed to the ousting of Omar al-Bashir’s nearly 30-year
regime.
In an effort to acquire desperately needed hard currency, the government has
reengaged in longstanding targeted efforts to crack down on Sudan’s politically
sensitive black market. Harsher punishments are now in place to thwart the extra-legal
possession or smuggling of gold and other mineral wealth that has been extracted
from the country, as this had previously been one of the main ways people illicitly
obtained foreign exchange. Likewise, the Government of Sudan has actively
encouraged importers to purchase gold from artisanal miners in order for the Central
Bank of Sudan to obtain foreign exchange. While these changes might signal to the
Sudanese public that the government is trying to improve their lot, they are likely to
have a limited impact on the cadre of elites who previously bene ted from suspected
criminal activity during the Bashir regime.
Now that the country has been removed from the US list of state sponsors of
terrorism, the  nancial assistance that will ideally follow from institutions such as the
World Bank and the IMF could not come soon enough, even as aid budgets have
sharply declined due to the global economic slowdown. In the meantime, Arab Gulf
countries have continued to  ll some  nancial gaps in Sudan, Gulf support has often
come with political strings, such as Sudanese troop support to the Saudi-led war effort
in Yemen. Much like oil and aid windfalls, Gulf money is subject to unforeseen shocks,
such as the 2017 political spat between Qatar and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
that resulted in reduced support from Qatar to Sudan.
Domestic resource mobilisation
One of the most meaningful ways for Sudan to navigate through present and future
national and global economic, political and social uncertainty is to search for more
domestic tax revenue. Promisingly, Sudan’s political leadership clearly recognises that
tax revenue is far more than a technocratic exercise and revised revenue raising and
revenue sharing powers notably feature in the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA).
And yet successive Sudanese governments have surprisingly limited experience
raising taxes. Since at least British occupation, the territory’s economy has been
overwhelmingly centralised around external rents, which have included cotton exports,
international loans, and oil. Direct taxes have consequently barely featured in the
national budget and sub-national governments have long depended on  scal transfers
from the central government. Despite nearly a century of local governance reforms,
the central government maintains tight control over taxes; as recently as 2010,
Khartoum collected an estimated 97% of o cial tax revenues. Much to the chagrin of
some of the rebels who signed the JPA, the vast majority of the country’s
wealth remains centralised in the Hamdi Triangle, which is named after the then
Minister of Finance who declared that development should be centralised within a
relatively short drive from Khartoum.
Given how little the country has historically been  nanced by tax revenue, Sudan’s tax
system is very poorly understood, which is a necessary precondition for any kind of tax
reform and durable and inclusive growth. While the central government dominates
o cial tax collection, a wide range of taxes exist throughout the country as people and
regions have learned to get by in the face of unreliable  scal transfers from the centre.
West Darfur’s uno cial tax and fee system likely differs widely from Red Sea State’s.
And taxes are about far more than raising money: they also reveal a whole subset of
authorities who bene t from the material and social windfalls associated with them,
akin to the networks that are believed to have thrived from the illicit gold trade. Should
the transitional government seek to reform the country’s tax system, these individuals
might subsequently have something to lose and block reforms.
Over the course of the next few months we are going to be studying the ‘real politics’
of Sudan’s tax system in more detail with the support of 18 Sudanese researchers
across the country. In addition to the ongoing economic crisis, this research is
particularly timely, given the Government of Sudan’s intentions to reform the tax
system to promote radical inclusion, build trust for a peaceful transition and ‘do no
harm’ as part of its 3-year transitional ‘productivity plan’, which this project will ideally
help inform. And, as the government seeks to again remove the subsidies that in part
mobilised protestors, questions of where additional sources of state  nance can be
generated have become even more salient. Likewise,  ndings will be generated to help
inform ongoing national economic planning efforts.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of the Con ict
Research Programme, the London School of Economics and Political Science, or the
UK Government.
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